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Abstract
A fascinating research program in neurophysiology attempts to quan-
tify the amount of information transmitted by single neurons. The claims
that emerge from this research raise new philosophical questions about
the nature of information. What kind of information is being quantified?
Do the resulting quantities describe empirical magnitudes like those found
elsewhere in the natural sciences? In this article, it is argued that neural
information quantities have a relativisitic character that makes them dis-
tinct from the kinds of information typically discussed in the philosophical
literature. It is also argued that despite this relativistic character, there
are cases in which neural information quantities can be viewed as robustly
objective empirical properties.
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Consider the claim that the H1 neuron in the visual system of the blowfly
transmits information at a rate of 81 bits per second. This claim conveys a
typical result generated by a fascinating research program in neurophysiology
that attempts to estimate the rate at which information flows through individual
neurons (Rieke et al., 1999; Frye and Dickinson, 2001; Van Hateren et al., 2005;
Neri, 2006). Working out exactly what is meant by such claims leads rapidly, and
inexorably, into philosophically contentious terrain. Despite this, such claims
have received hardly any serious attention in the philosophical literature.
Here I attempt to answer two questions about quantitative estimates of neu-
ral information. First, what kind of information do such estimates purport to
describe? Taxonomies of informational concepts have been developed both in
the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of biology. It is unclear, however,
that the kind of information referenced in the claim above conforms to any of the
existing analyses. The second question is whether information rate claims de-
scribe objective empirical magnitudes like those we find elsewhere in the natural
sciences. Analogical reasoning provides prima facie grounds for doubt. If I send
you a message in Morse code, and you happen not to know Morse code, there
is a sense in which little or no information has been transmitted, regardless of
what the decoded message might have said. In that sense, the quantity of infor-
mation transmitted by a physical signal depends on the interpretive capacities
of a receiver, and consequently appears to lack a certain kind of objectivity.
Of course, the sort of information described in the claim about the blowfly H1
neuron is quite unlike the kind of information typically transmitted by means
of conventional human symbol systems. Nevertheless, the comparison is not
entirely void of interest. In what follows, I’ll argue that there is a subtle but
theoretically significant sense in which the quantity of information transmitted
by a neural signal is relative to the capacity of a receiver mechanism to make
use of the signal. In order to answer the two questions above, it is necessary to
understand that relativity. I’ll begin by discussing a simple model to illustrate
what receiver-relativity means in a quantitative setting. Then, I’ll argue that
receiver-relativity is a real feature of the empirically driven estimates of neural
information transmission. In the second half of the article, I’ll build upon the
discussion of receiver-relativity to develop answers to the two questions posed
in the previous paragraph.
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1 Receiver-relativity in a simple model
Imagine a nocturnal organism with an extremely simple sensorimotor arc that
drives locomotion. There are three variables to consider. First, there is an en-
vironmental property X, which represents luminance. As far as the organism
is concerned, X can take on only three states, bright, dusk, and dark. Second,
there is a single perceptual neuron, Y, which can take on three discrete states
α and β, and γ. Third, there is a motor neuron, R, which controls locomotion.
The states of R are driven by the states of Y. The coupled system XYR is a
communication device in the sense associated with the mathematical theory of
communication. (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). As Figure 1 shows, X plays the
role of the information source, Y plays the role of the information transmitter,
and R plays the role of receiver. The fourth element in the diagram, which
Shannon and Weaver called the destination, is here interpreted somewhat ab-
stractly as the behavior of the organism that results from the motor signal at
R.
Figure 1: This figure is a neurophysiologically-oriented interpretation of the
classic diagram of a communication system that appears in Shannon and Weaver
(1949). The labels X, Y, and R correspond to what they called the source, the
transmitter, and the receiver, respectively. The rightmost box corresponds to
what they called the destination.
This is not the only way to interpret the neurobiology of perception in terms
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of Shannon’s diagram, but this interpretation provides a setup in which we
can ask questions about how the quantitative relation between two variables
might be influenced by a user of that relation. This way of setting up the XYR
model is reminiscent of an analogy that is common in discussions of neural
representation: that of reading a geographic map. X corresponds to the terrain,
Y corresponds to the map, and R corresponds to the person who uses the map
in order to navigate the terrain. The markings on the map are correlated with
the features of the terrain. It is in virtue of her ability to exploit that correlation
that the map-reader can navigate successfully. Similarly, in the XYR model,
the organism is able to decide whether to move or stay still by attending to the
correlation between X and Y.
α β γ Xm
bright .5 0 0 .5
dusk 0 .25 0 .25
dark 0 0 .25 .25
Ym .5 .25 .25
Table 1: A relative frequency table which represents a hypothetical joint
probability distribution over X and Y. The rightmost column represents the
marginal distribution of X, while the bottom row represents the marginal dis-
tribution of Y. Where I is the mutual information and H is the entropy,
I(X;Y ) = H(X) + H(Y ) − H(X,Y ). The upper bound on the amount of
transmittable information is given by the lesser of the two marginal entropies.
Here, the mutual information is: I(X;Y) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X,Y) = 1.5 + 1.5
- 1.5 = 1.5 bits/message.
Table 1 describes a hypothetical joint distribution over X and Y. Following
Shannon and Weaver, I refer to the states of X as messages, and to the states
of Y as signals (Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p. 2). The set of signals and
the set of messages are each represented by a random variable that follows a
given probability distribution. (An alternative but mathematically equivalent
formulation: the messages are the symbols sent from X to Y; the signals are
the symbols sent from Y to R.) Assuming that all messages and signals are
elementary symbols, (i.e. we ignore combinatorial codes) a simple calculation
shows that the mutual information between X and Y is 1.5 bits per message.1
1The entropy associated with a single value of some random variable is given by the log
of the reciprocal of its relative frequency. Log2(1/.5) = 1 bit. Log2(1/.25) = 2 bits. To find
the entropy of an entire distribution, we take a weighted sum over all individual entropies.
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Note that nothing thus far has been said about R. Can the properties of R
influence the amount of mutual information instantiated by the XY relation?
To explore this question, let us imagine that R is completely and chronically
insensitive to the distinction between β and γ. What consequences flow from
this supposition?
There are two principled ways of answering this question. According to the
first answer, the XY relation is to be viewed as a simple physical relation that
is not causally influenced by R, which, after all, is located downstream in the
causal chain. On this view, we will have to say that that although 1.5 bits of
information are indeed transmitted from X to Y, that 1.5 bit quantity is not
directly relevant to the functional capacities of the organism. Because the re-
ceiver mechanism can discriminate only a portion of the underlying distribution,
only a portion of the underlying distribution is relevant to explaining how the
organism manages to achieve behavioral control. The rest is explanatorily idle.
On this view, quantities of neural information can be assessed in isolation from
questions of biological function.
According to the second answer to our question about how R might influence
the XY relation, there is a flaw in the way we have attempted to describe the
scenario thus far. What sort of flaw? Notice that because the mutual informa-
tion between X and Y is logically entailed by the underlying probabilities, the
only way that R can influence the mutual information is by influencing those
probabilities. According to this second way of thinking, R’s insensitivity to β
and γ demonstrates that the given distribution is not an accurate representation
of the biological facts. If the organism cannot, even in principle, exploit the XY
relation for some biological end, then the correlation expressed by that rela-
tion isn’t one that can legitimately be used to compute the mutual information
between X and Y.
This second way of looking at the scenario is motivated by the thought that
neural information is essentially an expression of the biological capacities of
the organism. According to this second view, if we want to compute I(X,Y)
accurately, we must ensure that the given distribution include only those values
that have biological relevance. How can this restriction be accommodated in
So, the marginal entropy H(X) = .5(1) + .25(2) +.25(2) = 1.5. The computation required to
find the marginal entropy H(Y) is identical to that required for H(X). To compute the joint
entropy H(X,Y), we take a weighted sum over the individual entropies associated with each
of the six terms in the center of the table. Three of those terms evaluate to 0. Once they
are removed, the remaining terms constitute an expression that is identical to that for H(X),
which, as we just saw, is equal to 1.5 bits.
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our procedure for estimating I(X,Y)? The accommodation is straightforward
enough: since R is insensitive to the distinction between β and γ, we rewrite
the relative frequency table so that β and γ are counted together as two instances
of one biologically exploitable variable. In that case, a simple calculation shows
that there is exactly 1 bit of information flowing through the XYR system.
If this second way of looking at the scenario is correct, the original quantity
of 1.5 bits is a kind of fluke. A couple of paragraphs back, I said that the 1.5 bit
quantity was explanatorily idle. In light of that description, we might dub the
correlation from which it was computed an idle correlation. This notion can be
contrasted with the more familiar notion of a spurious correlation. A spurious
correlation between factors A and B is one in which there is no direct causal
relationship (in either direction) between A and B. Either the AB relation is
accidental, or it is the result of a common cause. An idle correlation need not
be spurious. The XY relation is a direct causal relation, and the correlation
evident in Table 1 is perfectly real. The idleness of an idle correlation stems
rather from the fact that the neural pathway in which it is embedded doesn’t
seem to “care about” it. For that reason, it fails to constitute an empirically
adequate explanatory factor.
We can extract two lessons from the comparison between our two interpreta-
tions of the insensitivity scenario. The first lesson is about how to explicate the
concept of receiver-relativity. An information system is receiver-relative just in
case the mutual information between the set of messages and the set of signals
depends on facts about how the underlying correlation is exploited by down-
stream mechanisms. The second lesson concerns the evaluation of our two ways
of looking at the insensitivity scenario. The choice between them seems to turn
on the issue of biological relevance. If neural information quantities express
purely physical facts that float free from considerations of biological function,
then the first way of looking at the scenario makes good sense. If, however,
neural information quantities express facts about the functional capacities of an
organism, then the receiver-relative view is more appropriate.
2 Some strengths of the receiver-relative view
In this section I argue that the receiver-relative conception of information does a
better job of capturing the content of information rate claims in neurophysiology
than does the non-relative conception.
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Someone might argue for the opposite view as follows. No matter how the
organism behaves, as long as there is a way of describing the X and Y variables
such that the probability distribution in Table 1 accurately represents their ac-
tivity, the 1.5 bit quantity follows with necessity. The best response to this claim
is not to deny its truth, but its relevance to scientific theory. There is indeed
a coherent notion of information according to which the XY relation expresses
1.5 bits, but it is not the notion of information we should be interested in if we
hope to learn anything significant about biology. Insisting on the correctness
of the 1.5 bit quantity is like insisting that there is a lot of information latent
in the correlation between the hair on your head and the direction of the wind.
Since no mechanisms are designed to make use of that correlation, the sense
in which it carries information is not the sense we have in mind when we say
that a neuron has transmitted a particular number of bits. When we say that
a neuron has transmitted a particular number of bits, what we mean is that it
has transmitted a particular number of useable bits. 2
To support this claim, I want to highlight the role of the signal-noise dis-
tinction in experimental practice. The first thing to note is that probability
distributions over stimulus and response are never simply given to us, as was
presumed in the XYR model. The experimental strategy is not to first examine
the probabilities, and then, in a second step, determine what portion of the
signal distribution has biological relevance. Rather, experiments are designed
to capture biologically relevant signals directly, so that the observed data are
already sorted into signal and noise components.
To see how this works, consider the following expression for mutual informa-
tion. Although it is mathematically equivalent to the one used above, this new
expression has the benefit of more closely mirroring experimental operations.
I(X,Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) (1)
The H(Y) term on the right side refers to the full entropy of the percep-
tual neuron, and it is operationalized by presenting the organism with a wide
variety of random stimuli, which, at least in theory, will elicit a representative
sample of the full range of physiologically possible response rates. H(Y|X) is
2It is worth noting here that the hair-in-the-wind argument exploits a perfectly contingent
fact about humans. Filiform hairs on the legs of crickets move with the local air currents
too. But in that case, neural receiver mechanisms use the hair-air correlation for predator
detection (Magal et al., 2006). In that case, hair direction really is an informational signal.
At least in principle, the amount of information transmitted in this case could be quantified.
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called the neural noise (Dayan and Abbott, 2001, p. 74; Borst and Theunissen,
1999, p. 950.) It is typically measured by presenting the organism with repeated
instances of the neuron’s preferred stimulus. The idea behind this operational-
ization is that, when a given value of X is simply repeated, there isn’t any
variation in its value about which one could hope to be informed. Under these
conditions, Y is not transmitting any information, despite the fact that it re-
mains active. Crucially, the set of responses elicited under these non-functional
conditions is not entirely abnormal. This spontaneous activity will reappear
under conditions in which the stimulus at X really does vary. Since we know
this activity is non-functional, its contribution to the variation must be filtered
out.
The idea that the H(Y|X) term should be regarded as non-functional activity
is equivalent to the assumption that the function of Y is to report to downstream
mechanisms on the status of X-like stimuli. This assumption shapes the exper-
imental design needed to get an accurate measurement of the information rate.
If, in fact, the function of Y is something other than reporting on the nature
of X-like stimuli, then we would need to employ a different experimental setup,
with different stimuli and background conditions. So we must ask: what em-
pirical facts make the actual measurement setup the right one to employ? The
actual setup is the right one because, as a matter of empirical fact, Y-signals
are used by the flight motor for the purpose of navigating through stimuli of
precisely the kind employed in the experiment.
This is the crucial insight behind the argument that informational quanti-
ties are receiver-relative. The nature of Y’s function depends on the manner in
which its activities are exploited by downstream mechanisms. Since experimen-
tal procedures show that the value of I(X,Y) depends on Y’s functional role,
we can say that the value of I(X,Y) depends on how signals from Y are used
downstream. And since, according to the definition in Section 2, an informa-
tional quantity is receiver-relative just in case the quantity depends on how the
underlying correlation is used, I(X,Y) is a receiver-relative quantity.
To make this more concrete, notice that the assumption that the unique
function of Y is to report to downstream mechanisms on the nature of X-like
stimuli is far from trivial. Many neurons play functional roles that are far too
subtle to be isolated in behavioral experiments. This is one reason why experi-
ments are only performed on a small number of simple model systems and why
those model systems are almost invariably perceptual or sensory. Only systems
with a highly streamlined functional profile which is systematically related to
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environmental properties are sufficiently transparent for experimentalists to con-
firm that a particular experimental setup is appropriate for getting an accurate
estimate of I(X,Y).
Take the H1 neuron as an example. It is probably fair to say that the H1
neuron is the chief model neuron in information-theoretic neurophysiology. Why
is that? H1 makes for a great model neuron because the simplicity of the sys-
tem in which it is embedded makes it possible to reliably detect when its signals
have been received successfully. When H1 signals are received successfully, they
influence the flight of the organism quite directly. Even in this simple system
however, confirming that a particular experimental setup accurately exploits
the biological function of the neuron requires a rich patchwork of background
knowledge. First, lesion experiments have established that H1 signals track hor-
izontal optic flow (Frye and Dickinson, 2001). On the basis of that knowledge,
experimentalists can be confident that vertical sine-wave gratings will serve as
appropriate stimuli, and that fine tuning the contrast and angular velocity of
such stimuli will trigger something close to the maximal neural response. Sec-
ond, the perception-action loop from H1 to the flight motor is tight. Each H1
cell synapses with centrifugal horizontal cells that govern the part of the flight
motor that creates horizontal torque (Neri, 2006). This is important because it
means that the successful receipt of H1 signals can be confirmed through behav-
ioral observation. Moreover, there is only one H1 neuron in each lobule of the
fly’s brain; one corresponding to each eye. This is strong anatomical evidence
that the H1 is the only perceptual neuron that contributes in such a direct way
to horizontal flight control. As a result, whenever we observe the fly making
highly accurate horizontal flight adjustments (which it does at a millisecond res-
olution, flying at speeds up to two meters per second), we can be sure that the
signals responsible for that behavior are coming from H1 (Frye and Dickinson,
2001). Without this rich patchwork of behavioral and anatomical knowledge
that tells us what H1 signals are supposed to accomplish, we would not be able
to tell whether the activity of the H1 neuron is being exploited on any particular
occasion. And if we didn’t know that, we wouldn’t know whether our experi-
mental design accurately captures the noise in the system. The take home point
here is that receiver-relativity is not only real, it is consequential. We cannot
reliably estimate neural information quantities without (i) having a clear un-
derstanding of how the underlying stimulus-response correlation is exploited to
achieve some biological end, and (ii) confirmation that the experimental setup
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actually exploits that function.3
3 What kind of information is being estimated?
We are now in position to investigate the first of the two questions posed in the
introduction: what kind of information do estimates of informational quantities
in the brain purport to describe? We’ve already established that informational
quantities are receiver-relative. Now the goal is provide an analysis of the empir-
ical magnitude that we have quantified, and see how that empirical magnitude
fits into the larger landscape of philosophical thought about information.
The question is motivated in part by a desire to better understand the con-
tent of neurophysiological theory. But it is also motivated by a desire to bet-
ter understand informational quantities generally. Informational quantities are
philosophically interesting in part because they seem to straddle two radically
disparate conceptual arenas. From one perspective, information quantities are
the unsurprising result of a choice to represent ordinary empirical phenomena
with a particular collection of mathematical tools. Rather than representing
an empirical variable with a probability distribution, we represent it as a log-
arithmic function of a probability distribution. This change in mathematical
notation, it seems natural to think, has no deep metaphysical implications at
all. The empirical variables that we have elected to represent with this logarith-
mic notation are no less ordinary than any other feature of the empirical world
that lends itself to probabilistic representation. From another perspective, how-
ever, the appropriateness of information-theoretic tools reflects the fact that
there is something signal-like about the character of the empirical phenomenon
itself. We employ information-theoretic tools precisely because we hope to high-
light that signal-like character. It is from this perspective that it seems fitting
to characterize information as the currency of communication. From this per-
spective, there is indeed something unusual about the empirical magnitudes we
attempt to quantify information-theoretically. To see this, one must only recall
the truism that communication is, at least paradigmatically, a relation between
3I have not given a definition of the term “function.” As the size of the philosophical
literature on the subject suggests, it is not easy to say exactly what it means for an object
or process to have a biological function. For many aspects of biological theory, including the
kind of function discussed here, I favor the modern history theory of functions, as expressed in
Godfrey-Smith (1994). But my view is compatible with other theories of biological function
as well. It is important, however, that the notion of function have some relation to natural
history. Without that connection, it loses some of the objectivity that I argue is worth
retaining in neurophysiological theory. See Section 4 for further commentary on this point.
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agents. With that truism in mind, the treatment of small and patently non-
thinking neurons in informational terms is deeply interesting, and maybe even
perplexing.
Both in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of biology, this ten-
sion between the ordinary and the perplexing aspects of information has been
diagnosed as the result of verbal ambiguity. Our word “information,” it is often
claimed, denotes two distinct concepts. One of them, which, for the purposes of
disambiguation is often labeled Shannon information, is a technical concept. It
may evoke conceptual puzzles related to the interpretation of probability, but
its use does not require any controversial metaphysical assumptions about the
nature of communication. The second concept, which is often labeled semantic
information, is taken to be central to understanding communicative phenomena,
and is also taken to raise a special set of problems in the philosophy of mind
and the philosophy of biology. Many sub-varieties of information have been
discussed in the philosophical literature, but every philosophical survey of in-
formation introduces this distinction.4 It is therefore appropriate to restrict the
discussion to the question of whether the sort of information under scrutiny in
this discussion can be subsumed under either of these two umbrella categories.
3.1 The semantic interpretation
Are neural information estimates best interpreted as claims about semantic in-
formation? It is common, especially for sensory neurons, to be described as
being engaged in acts of representation. For example, in a passage about the
filiform hairs on cricket cerci, Purves et al say “peripheral sensory neurons
associated with the hairs represent the full range of air current directions and
velocities impinging on the animal” (Purves et al., 2001, p. 195). Since represen-
tational phenomena and semantic phenomena are closely related, the semantic
interpretation seems plausible.
To investigate the semantic interpretation more carefully, we must first no-
tice that the question we have posed is a bit ambiguous, and can be fruitfully
separated into two lines of inquiry. The first is whether the phrase “81 bits/s” in
the claim “The H1 neuron transmits information at a rate of 81 bits/s” picks out
a semantic property of a neural signal. The answer to this question is a decisive
‘no.’ The question of how many bits are associated with an informational signal
4A very recent survey is Floridi (2015). Other prominent surveys include Sayre (1976),
Adams (2003), and Harms (2006).
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is orthogonal to the question of what semantic features that signal expresses.
Two strings can have entirely different meanings and nevertheless transmit the
same number of bits. Consider, for example, a long binary string. The ones and
zeros may be equally probable, but that hardly entails that they mean the same
thing.5 Conversely, two tokens of one string may be semantically equivalent
but nevertheless transmit different quantities of information. For example, the
meaningful string “it is currently raining” carries more information for someone
in a windowless room than it does for someone standing outside.
The second line of inquiry prompted by the semantic interpretation of neural
information estimates is the following. Do neural information estimates describe
how much semantic information is flowing through a circuit, without purporting
to specify what the semantic content is? In other words, do neural information
estimates measure how much meaning is flowing through a system? Mundane
examples suggest that this idea is at least coherent. One might want to insist,
for example, that the quantity of semantic information conveyed by a particular
sentence is less than the quantity conveyed by the book in which it appears.
There is an interesting history in logic, tracing back to the work of Bar-Hillel
and Carnap (1953), which tries to make this idea precise. One reason to resist
this interpretation of neural information estimates is that the amount of seman-
tic information in a system is a matter of what is said about things outside the
system, whereas the amount of information in neural information rates is de-
termined entirely by the probabilities attached to the variables that constitute
the system. Semantic properties are relational. They hold between a symbol
and the thing it stands for. Probabilities need not be relational. They can just
describe the frequency with which one kind of thing happens, without talking
about the relation between that thing and something else.6
5I have suppressed the role of time in this discussion because it complicates the mathematics
without changing the conceptual issues under consideration. Notice that the argument doesn’t
change significantly if we consider two non-identical strings sent from one location to another
over time. If strings share statistical properties, their transmission may achieve the same
information rate expressed in bits/s. This is still no reason to think that the two strings have
the same meaning.
6Another, more controversial, reason to resist the semantic interpretation of information
theoretic estimates is that the activity in a single neuron seems to be too low-level for semantic
properties to emerge at all. If there are no semantic properties at the level of individual
neurons, then, clearly, information estimates describing the behavior of individual neurons
cannot be interpreted semantically. Rosa Cao has defended this anti-semantic position on the
basis of an interesting dilemma. The signals transmitted by individual neurons either lack
sufficiently robust connections to the external world to carry content on their own, or the
connections they exhibit are too inflexible too deserve an informational, as opposed to merely
causal, mode of description (Cao, 2012).
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3.2 The Shannon interpretation
If neural information estimates are not best interpreted in terms of semantic
information, what about Shannon information? Here the situation is a bit more
difficult to assess because philosophical commentary on the nature of Shannon
information has been somewhat out of step with its use in science and engi-
neering. Definitions of Shannon information in the philosophical literature tend
to have an ontological orientation that is completely absent in technical manu-
als on the subject, where definitions of key concepts are purely mathematical,
and no suggestions are made about the range of empirical phenomena to which
the mathematics is legitimately applied.7 The ontologically oriented definitions
found in the philosophical literature tend to be radically permissive. Consider,
for example, the definition proposed in a review paper on information in bi-
ology by Godfrey-Smith and Sternly: “For Shannon, anything is a source of
information if it has a number of alternative states that might be realized on a
particular occasion. Any other variable contains some information about that
source, or carries information about it, if its state is correlated with the state of
the source”(Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, 2008).8 A similar definition is found
in a more recent article on information by Piccinini and Scarantino that gives a
thorough overview of informational concepts. They say: “The identity of a com-
munication theoretic message is fully described by two features: it is a physical
structure distinguishable from a set of alternative physical structures, and it
belongs to an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive physical structures selectable
with well-defined probabilities” (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2011, p. 20).
As highlighted by their use of the term “identity,” the two criteria mentioned
in the Piccinini and Scarantino definition are to be read not only as necessary
conditions, but also as sufficient conditions for the presence of quantitative
information. Godfrey-Smith and Sternly’s use of the phrase “any other variable”
likewise suggests that correlation between empirical variables is to be read as
a sufficient condition. According to such permissive definitions, then, anything
that can be modeled by information theory is, ipso facto, information.
Working scientists can be forgiven for asking what the point of such a permis-
sive concept could possibly be. The motivation behind the permissive concept is
7See, for example, Cover and Thomas (1991).
8The phrase “For Shannon” in this definition might be misleading. Shannon was many
things, but he was not a metaphysician. He was not interested in trying to divide the world
into informational phenomena and non-informational phenomena. In fact, in a short paper
entitled “The Bandwagon,” Shannon warns that information theory is easily misused when
applied outside the realm of communications technology (Shannon, 1956).
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its metaphysical innocence. The desire for metaphysical innocence traces back
to the work of Fred Dretske who, in his 1981 book Knowledge and the Flow of
Information, hoped to develop a naturalistic and reductive theory of semantics
(Dretske, 1981). In order for the desired reduction to count as a theoretically
significant achievement, the reductive base had to be something far less meta-
physically controversial than the phenomenon to be reduced. Since covariation
between empirical variables is about as metaphysically innocent as it gets, it
was a natural choice for Dretske.
With this background on the philosophical appropriation of Shannon’s ideas
in place, we can return to the question of whether the philosopher’s permis-
sive notion of Shannon information is the right concept with which to interpret
neural information estimates. Again, I think the answer is ‘no.’ Definitions of
information focused on covariation between empirical variables are so easily sat-
isfied that they rule out almost nothing. In particular, they cannot distinguish
the correlations that support genuine information transmission from merely idle
correlations. Recall from Section 2 that an idle correlation is one which may be
supported by a direct causal relationship, but which is, nevertheless, not among
the correlations that are exploited for purposes of biological control.
If we employ the permissive conception of information to interpret the claim
that the H1 neuron transmits 81 bits/s, the empirical content of the resulting
claim is implausibly sparse. It says, in effect, that we happen to have observed
a correlation which led us to the 81 bits/s figure. In fact there is nothing
happenstance about it. Experiments were painstakingly designed to evoke the
performance capacity of the neuron. As discussed in Section 3, in order to get
an accurate estimate of the mutual information, experiments must be designed
to filter out idle correlations (noise), from genuine information-supporting cor-
relations (signals). We can conclude that the permissive concept is not the right
one for interpreting neural information claims. The concept of neural informa-
tion, therefore, cannot be subsumed under either of the two prominent umbrella
categories employed in the existing philosophical taxonomies of informational
concepts.
If the quantitative kind of information described in neurophysiological esti-
mates is neither semantic nor permissive, what kind of information is it? The
idea that has been missing from the analysis thus far is that of biological func-
tion. Neural information is instantiated, not wherever there are empirical corre-
lations, but only where biological control systems have evolved to exploit corre-
lations. When we estimate the quantity of information flowing through a neural
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pathway, we are not simply re-expressing a physical quantity on a logarithmic
scale. Instead, we are expressing a fact about a specific biological capacity of
an organism.
This functional conception of information doesn’t fit neatly into the existing
philosophical taxonomies. Nevertheless, it is not entirely novel. The notion of
information in signaling games, such as those described in Skyrms (2010), is
also, at least in a very broad sense, functional. In a typical game, we have a
communication setup that looks a lot like the XYR model: it includes a set of
environmental states, a set of possible signals, and a set of receiver responses. In
Section 2, I emphasized that if we want to quantify the information in a biologi-
cal system, we must heed the distinction between functional and non-functional
activity. Is this point sufficiently general to apply to the informational quantities
in signaling games? In principle, yes. A vervet who looks up at the sky has not
(yet) signaled that an eagle is near, even if there happens to be some correlation
between looking up and the presence of eagles. So it would be a mistake to in-
clude “looking up” events when quantifying the information in vervet predator
signaling. Despite this, there is no methodologically significant parallel between
the notion of information in signaling games and that in neurophysiology. The
primary reason for this is that signaling game models are not data driven. The
insights they provide do not typically depend on accurate estimation of empiri-
cal magnitudes. Modelers simply stipulate that, for example, the environment is
to be partitioned into three discrete states. In neurophysiology, the partitioning
must be discovered rather than stipulated.
Moreover, as Cao (2012) emphasizes, the notion of information in the sig-
naling game literature is only applicable within a game-like setting, where the
notion of utility has some natural application. Definitions of information in
the signaling game context are not, therefore, sufficiently general to cover all
functional notions of information, and they are particularly awkward to ap-
ply to within-organism communication systems, where the notion of utility is
undefined.
So what would a definition of information look like, if it was designed to
capture within-organism functional phenomena? The following definition, de-
veloped by Bergstrom and Rosvall, provides a good starting point.
An object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce,
by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an
agent who observes X (Bergstrom and Rosvall, 2008).
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This definition is on the right track.9 However, as Godfrey-Smith (2011)
suggested in a response article, it is difficult to understand what exactly is
meant by the term “agent” in the definition. The following dilemma reinforces
Godfrey-Smith’s worry. If the term “agent” is meant in the full-fledged sense
of an autonomous, goal-driven decision maker, then it seems unlikely to apply
to small neural mechanisms. If it is meant only as an abstraction, perhaps in
the sense of an ideal observer of the system, then nature cannot have selected
the object for its effects on the agent. In that case, the phrase “function of X”
seems toothless, and the definition loses empirical content.
Bergstrom and Rosvall’s appeal to agency is not merely a quirk in their
presentation. The appeal to agency is seductive, and is deeply embedded in both
philosophical and scientific discussions of information theory. Unfortunately, the
appeal to agency threatens to undermine a kind of scientific objectivity that we
should hope to preserve in any respectable neurophysiological theory. In the
next section, I take up the question of objectivity, and try to reconcile it with
the kind of receiver-relativity discussed in Sections 2 and 3.
4 Is neural information objective?
In their book Memory and the Computational Brain Gallistel and King provide
an eminently clear and thorough account of what a successful theory of neural
representation would have to include, and the various ways in which current
theories fall short. One of the most prominent themes in the book is the warning
that we are likely to overestimate the degree to which we understand how the
brain works if we are not careful to insist on concrete, material interpretations
of central concepts like “representation” and “computation.” Nevertheless, in
their discussion of information theory, which plays a central role in the account,
they too fall back on the notion of agency. The authors, who deserve praise for
their intellectual honesty, are explicit about this appeal, and quite candid about
its less palatable consequences.
This is an absolutely critical point about communicated information
- and the subjectivity it implies is deeply unsettling. By subjectivity,
we mean that the information communicated by a signal depends on
the receiver’s (the subject’s) prior knowledge of the possibilities and
9Although their article is focused on genetic information, they suggest that their definition
can be extended to include neural information quantities.
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their probabilities. Thus the information actually communicated
is not an objective property of the signal from which the subject
obtained it (Gallistel and King, 2009, p. 8)!
I agree that the implied subjectivity is deeply unsettling. It is unsettling
because, if a physical magnitude depends on the perspective of an agent (or
subject), it lacks a paradigm kind of scientific objectivity. In an overview of the
philosophical literature on scientific objectivity, Sprenger and Reiss suggest that
discussions of scientific objectivity typically begin with the following thought.
There are, fundamentally, two kinds of qualities in the world. . . “the ones that
vary with the perspective one has or takes, and the ones that remain constant
through changes of perspective” (Reiss and Sprenger, 2014, p. 4). What it
means to say that a body of scientific theory is objective is that it restricts
itself to properties of the latter sort. If informational quantities depend on the
epistemic state of an agent, then they are not invariant to shifts in perspective,
and therefore lack this basic variety of scientific objectivity. That is a conceptual
flaw we should be unwilling to accept.
Before I give my own definition of information, let us ask why scientists and
philosophers alike so frequently rely on notions of agency to describe informa-
tional quantities. The root of the problem may be the overwhelming temptation
to rely on analogies to cases of information measurement in human communi-
cation. Here is a simple case that illustrates how such analogies generally work.
A politician on the campaign trail has four prepared speeches, and chooses one
for each scheduled speaking event. For most of the people in the audience,
the speech contains lots of information. But for the speech writer, who, let us
suppose, is tagging along on the campaign trail, the quantity of information
communicated is much smaller. For her, there are only four possible signals,
and all the uncertainty associated with the event is resolved as soon as the first
few words are uttered. If we assume that the speeches are chosen at random and
with equal probability, the speech writer receives exactly two bits of informa-
tion as soon as she recognizes which of the four speeches has been selected. In
this situation, the epistemic state of the receiver (the speech writer) effectively
partitions the source into distinct signals, and the manner of that partitioning
determines the quantity of information transmitted. If we model all instances of
information transmission on cases like this, it is hard to suppress the suspicion
that informational quantities have an irreducibly subjective quality.
Agential definitions of informational quantities do get something right: they
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highlight the relativistic nature of information. But it is not necessary to rely
on the notion of agency to do this. Instead, we can simply insist that the infor-
mational quantity associated with a signal depends on the role that the signal
plays in the functional economy of the organism. Notice that the political speech
story bears structural similarities to the XYR model explored in Section 2. In
both cases, properties of the receiver have a direct influence on the probabilities
attached to the signals. In the political speech case, the influence is epistemic;
it has to do with the speech writer’s priors. In the XYR model, there is no
agent to whom such Bayesian properties could be ascribed. The influence is
instead a matter of functional capacity. This parallel suggests a way forward
for constructing a definition of information that captures the concept at work in
neural information estimates without relying on agency. I’ll use the Bergstrom
and Rosvall definition as a starting point.
An object X conveys information if (i) the sequence properties of X
are correlated with the states of some variable Y that has biological
relevance to the organism and (ii) there exists a receiver mechanism
R, whose function it is to exploit the correlation between X and Y
to realize some biological capacity.
This definition is admittedly loose, and is not intended to serve as any-
thing like a procedure for sorting informational systems from non-informational
systems. The difficulties of that task are buried in the meaning of the terms “se-
quence properties” and “receiver mechanism,” the interpretation of which will
vary dramatically from one biological system to the next. It is even less useful for
determining how much information is flowing through a biological communica-
tion system. It does, however, manage to present the notion of an informational
quantity in a way that acknowledges its relativistic character without hitching
it to the troublesome notion of agency.
When interpreted as claims about this kind of information, neural informa-
tion estimates have the potential for a substantial kind of scientific objectivity.
This is because the kind of relativity at issue is relativity to the capacities of
a biological mechanism which we can, at least in the best cases, identify and
observe. Of course, this view also suggests that neural information estimates
are subject to the vagaries of functional analysis. In those cases where the
functional role of a neuron is clearly specifiable, such as it is in the case of the
H1 neuron, estimates of neural information are reasonably objective. In cases
in which the functional role of a neuron is less clearly specifiable, the correct
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experimental procedure for determining the role of noise in the system will be
underdetermined by the facts at hand. Or, when a single neuron plays multiple
functional roles at once which cannot easily be disentangled experimentally, we
should expect that no particular estimate will be the final word one the matter.
5 Conclusion
I have emphasized that neural information estimates quantify functional capac-
ities. Their values are entailed by underlying correlations between empirical
variables. However, because they have a fundamentally functional character,
they cannot be estimated accurately without taking into account the manner
in which those correlations are used by downstream mechanisms. The concept
of information implicit in information estimates of neural activity is novel; it
doesn’t correspond to either of the most prominent conceptions of information
in the philosophical literature. Finally, I argued that, despite appearances to the
contrary, there are cases where neural information estimates can be regarded as
robustly objective properties of a neural system, despite the relativity to which
they are inevitably subject.
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